A clustered sensor network collects two or more nodes and makes a cluster from them. Generally a cluster head (CH) has all the encryption keys of the nodes in a cluster and performs encrypted communication.
INTRODUCTION
Wireless sensor networks are known as ad hoc networks that consist only of sensor nodes connectable by radio. Generally, the sensor nodes send various data such as the temperature, humidity, etc., to a base station (BS) directly or indirectly through multi-hop routing. Sensor networks can be used for various purposes, from military to noncommercial uses, and are expected to become the next-generation communication infrastructure.
However, sensor nodes are not tamper resistant and do not have high computational resources owing to cost factors. Therefore, it is difficult to perform complicated calculations like public key encryption. Additionally, since the memory capacity of a sensor node is small, the amount of data it can hold is limited. Moreover, sensor nodes have a low-capacity battery. Therefore, efficient energy consumption is an important consideration point. In addition, since sensor nodes are often placed outdoors to monitor the information in the field, an attacker can easily steal and analyze the nodes to obtain sensitive information. In contrast, a BS is generally managed securely and has enough electrical power and computational resources.
The main research on sensor networks is how to decrease the energy consumption of sensor nodes, and there are many results on efficient energy consumption. One of these is LEACH (Low Energy Adaptive Clustering Hierarchy) (Heinzelman et al., 2000) , which has been proposed as a clustered sensor network. A clustered sensor network makes a group of nodes called a cluster and sets one of these nodes as the cluster head (CH). The nodes in each cluster send the sensing data to the CH. The CH then forwards the data to the BS. What LEACH does is to change the CHs in turn so that the clusters are independently composed without the need for a BS. In LEACH, when all the nodes are periodically set to CH, the deviation of the energy consumption of all the nodes is equalized, allowing the life of the network to be extended.
However, the original LEACH protocol did not consider the issue of security. Thus, some new LEACH protocols that realize security using common key encryption, such as SecLEACH (Oliveira et al., 2007) , MS-LEACH (Qiang et al., 2009) , etc., were proposed.
However, almost all of the key sharing schemes in a clustered sensor network have the same problem: since the CH has the encryption keys of all the nodes in the cluster to perform encrypted communication, if the CH is analyzed, these encryption keys are revealed. Moreover, when all the nodes are set to the CH like in LEACH, another problem arises, which is the need for big storage to hold the keys of all the nodes in the cluster.
On the other hand, some key sharing schemes use (k,n) secret sharing scheme. The secret sharing scheme makes n shares from a secret, and the secret can be restored from k (k≦n) shares. In the key sharing scheme, when CH does not have any keys, it restores the encryption key by receiving shares from k neighboring nodes (Bertier et al., 2010) . However in these schemes, the encryption key is leaked either by the analysis of k neighboring nodes or k communication paths, both of which are smaller than the total number of child nodes. Therefore, some schemes, e.g., that proposed in (Yiying et al., 2013 ) use a public key cryptosystem to hide the shares. However, because of the computational complexity of a public key cryptosystem, the energy consumption of a node is very large.
In this paper, we propose the following three kind of key sharing schemes using secret sharing schemes.
(1) The first scheme realizes that, even if the nodes including the CH are analyzed, the CH does not at all reveal the key between the nodes that are not analyzed. This means that this scheme realizes information theoretical security on key analysis. (2) The second scheme is a key sharing scheme in which the CH does not need to save the keys or the shares on all the nodes in a cluster, but manages only its own key. Realization of this scheme requires the secret sharing scheme to be improved. This scheme achieves computational security. (3) The third scheme is a key sharing scheme that does not leak the key at all even if CH or all of the child nodes are analyzed. This scheme can either select information theoretical security or computational security. The first scheme is recommended if the user wants to focus on information theoretical security against CH analysis and if the storage capacity of the nodes is sufficient to hold the keys. The second scheme is recommended for Internet of Things (IoT) device that requires fewer calculation and memory resources. The third scheme is suitable for group key sharing which is used as a common key within a cluster.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In Section II, we explain LEACH and discuss existing research studies on LEACH with security. Section III describes the first scheme using an existing secret sharing scheme. Section IV describes the improved secret sharing scheme and the second scheme. Section V presents the third scheme and its variations. Finally, in Section VI, we describe the performance evaluation.
EXISTING RESEARCH STUDIES

Leach
LEACH is a protocol that selects a node that, in turn, becomes the CH and averages the energy consumption of all nodes to extend the life of clustered sensor networks. LEACH has two communication phases: a setup phase and a steady-state phase. In the setup phase, LEACH uses a random number to choose a CH in a cluster. The chosen node then broadcasts a message that it has become the CH. The nodes choose the nearest CH and send a message that they have become child nodes. The CH then sends a time division multiple access (TDMA) schedule for the steady-state phase to the child nodes. In the steadystate phase, the nodes send the sensing data to the CH according to the TDMA schedule. The CH compresses the data received from multiple child nodes and transmits the combined data to the BS.
SecLEACH
In SecLEACH, an administrator sets some element keys to each node before use at random from a key pool, which is a set of element keys. Each element key has a key ID. SecLEACH performs key sharing in the setup phase as follows: 1. The CH announces the key IDs to the child nodes. 2. Each child node selects a key ID(s) that is (are) common to the CH. 3. Each child node transmits the common key ID(s) to the CH. 4. Each child node and the CH generate and save the common key, which was generated by the common element key(s).
SecLEACH can determine a common key by knowing only the ID of the element keys. However, SecLEACH has some problems. First, the key sharing between the CH and a node is probabilistic because there is not necessarily a common element key. If a child node does not have a common key, the node cannot communicate with the CH. Second, if an attacker steals and analyzes nodes, the keys of the other nodes may be analyzed. That is, SecLEACH is weak to node analysis. If the number of element keys that are saved is increased, analysis will become difficult and the problem of requiring more memory for the element keys arises.
In addition, all the keys of the nodes in a cluster are revealed if the CH is analyzed every time after key sharing.
MS-LEACH
MS-LEACH uses the Localized Encryption and Authentication Protocol (LEAP) to obtain a common key.
All the nodes have a function to generate pseudo-random number. The procedure for obtaining a common key is as follows:
1. An administrator makes an initial key K and sets it to all nodes. A child node u makes a master key Ku = E K (u). E K (u) is a pseudo-random function that uses as input K and node ID u. 2. The CH and a child node transmit their own ID to each other. 3. A child node u makes a common key K UV = E Ku (ch) using the pseudo-random function, with Ku and the CH ID as input. 4. The CH makes the master key Ku using the pseudo-random function, with K and a child node's ID as input. After that, the CH makes a common key K UV = E Ku (ch) using the master key Ku and its own ID. 5. All the nodes delete the initial key K after making a common key. When MS-LEACH is used, the CH can share the keys with all nodes certainly. In MS-LEACH, even if an attacker steals and analyzes a node after the deletion of the initial key, the other links remain secure. However, all common keys are leaked if an attacker obtains an initial key K, since MS-LEACH generates the entire key from the initial key. In addition, MS-LEACH does not realize information theoretical security since it makes the common key using a pseudo-random function.
All the keys of the nodes in a cluster are revealed if the CH is analyzed every time after key sharing.
SSKM: Secret Sharing-based Key Management
To keep secure channel for delivering shares, SSKM (Yiying et al., 2013) adopt the discrete logarithm in the finite field and DDH difficulty assumption. Therefore, this scheme requires a large amount of communication and computational complexity, because the discrete logarithm is calculated on a large finite field. This scheme shares one cluster key (group key) between all the nodes. [Initial phase] Assume that there are −1 clusters, and each cluster has a cluster head and n (n ≥ k) member nodes. In this phase, BS sets the parameters for key sharing. 1. BS chooses two big primes 1 and 1; let = 2 1 + 1 and = 2 1 + 1, = ; it is computationally intractable to solve the factor without , . Meanwhile, BS selects a generator ( ∈[
, ]) and another prime ( > ). And then, BS broadcasts the three triple ( , , ) to sensors in the network. 2. BS randomly and uniformly chooses a polynomial ( ) of (k − 1)-degree for each cluster as follows:
. BS independently selects a session key CH from GF( ) in the finite field and hides the session key with secret CH, namely ZCH=KCH+SCH. [Cluster key management] 1. CH chooses xch randomly which relatively primes with p-1 and q-1, and CH sends it to BS. Then, BS counts out yCH= xch and sends (IDCH, yCH) to sensor node in cluster; meanwhile, sensor node picks xi randomly which relatively primes with p-1 and q-1, computes yi= xi mod N, and then sends (IDi, yi) to the BS. The BS ensures that if IDi ≠ IDj, there should be no yi=yj; otherwise it reselects until success. Furthermore, the BS utilizes CH's IDCH and members' IDi (i=1,...,k) to count out the share fCH (IDCH) and fCH (IDi), respectively. 2. The CH selects a group of users = {ID1,…, IDk}, while BS unicasts (IDCH, fCH(IDCH)･(yi) xch mod N) to sensor node in the cluster and sends (IDi, fCH(IDi)･(yCH) xi mod ) to CH.
BS sends ZCH not to leak the KCH. [Secret recovery]
Depending on the received information from BS, public generator, node's private key , and CH's own key CH, cluster head and members can obtain their share through the following formulas:
3 FIRST SCHEME 3.1 A Fast Secret Sharing Scheme using XOR Shamir's secret sharing scheme is a typical scheme. However, since this scheme needs a polynomial operation, it is complicated to process in a sensor node. Therefore, we selected a fast secret sharing scheme (Kurihara et al., 2008) using just an exclusive OR (XOR) operation. This scheme has minimal processing requirements and information theoretical security. The details of this scheme are omitted owing to page restrictions.
Application to LEACH
Existing key sharing schemes (Bertier et al., 2010) distributes n shares to n nodes and collects any k (k ≦ n) out of n to recover the encryption key. The BS knows the aforementioned information about all nodes, and communication using the unique key K i between the BS and each node is secure. The proposed scheme can be applied independently to every cluster or CH even if there are two or more clusters or CHs. Our schemes are performed in the setup phase after selecting the CH. In the first scheme, we set k=2. Since each child node performs a one-to-one key sharing with the CH, the number of the targeting child node is 1 for one key. We can select (n,k)=(3,2) and a child node that has W i1 and W i2 without storing the link key, but the following is easier.
In our schemes, although BS sends encrypted shares to each child node directly to keep the explanation simple, the shares can be sent via CH. 
Security Assessment
(1) Security Against CH Analysis The CH has only one share on one key. Therefore, since k=2, no link key is revealed even if the CH is analyzed except for the time of encryption communication. This scheme has information theoretical security based on the secret sharing scheme in 3.1. Since key sharing between the CH and each node is independently set, even if two or more CHs are analyzed, the security does not change. However, at the time of encryption communication, since CH restores the link key to communicate with a child node, the link key is revealed. However, a key sharing scheme equal to an attack that combines CH analysis and information to CH to generate a key, does not exist as far as the authors know. In addition, since the CH in other schemes contains all the keys of the child nodes, all these keys are leaked every time the CH is analyzed.
(2) Security Against Child Node Analysis Each child node has its own link key L i . Therefore, the link key is leaked if a child node is analyzed. However, L i is set independently, which means that the link keys of the other nodes are not revealed at all; thus, this scheme realizes information theoretical security also in regard to child node analysis. In contrast, as described previously, when many child nodes are analyzed in SecLEACH, or when a child node is analyzed before eliminating the initial key in MS-LEACH, the other link keys are revealed.
(3) Security Against CH and Child Node Analysis
The first scheme has the same security as the child node analysis, even if both the CH and child nodes are analyzed. This is because each link key L i is set up independently, and the number of shares that the CH has is one for one key. (4) Security Against Eavesdropping on Communication Paths Although W i1 is sent as it is in the key sharing and encrypted communication phase, since W i0 does not appear in the communication path, information theoretical security is realized. SecLEACH also realizes information theoretical security since it sends only the key ID, whereas MS-LEACH realizes computational security.
SECOND SCHEME
In the first scheme, the CH needs to save all the shares of the child nodes. Therefore, we propose the second scheme in which the CH does not need to save these shares, but only manages its own key. However, the second scheme cannot be realized by applying the secret sharing scheme in 3.1 as it is. Therefore, we apply asymmetric reduction (Takahashi et al., 2014) to the scheme in 3.1. Asymmetric reduction reduces the shares of each server non-uniformly, in contrast to the ramp scheme, which reduces the shares in each server uniformly. In other words, the asymmetric secret sharing scheme can set the shares on the server up to k-1 to 0 (it manages only a key). The asymmetric reduction in (Takahashi et al., 2014) was applied to Shamir's secret sharing scheme and has been proven to have computational security, which depends on the security of the pseudo-random number used. Therefore, we show the asymmetric secret sharing scheme of 3.1 as follows.
Asymmetric Secret Sharing Scheme using XOR
In the following scheme, secret information S has an ID named IS, and the size of the secret key is (n-1)d bits. '⨁' is XOR, and '||' is the connection of the bit sequence.
[Distribution]
The dealer arbitrarily selects t (1 ≦ t ≦ k-1)
servers in n servers and calls them key servers. The ID of the key servers is i (1≦i≦t). The dealer and the key server have a pseudorandom number generator. 2. The dealer sets key i to each key server i.
The dealer generates a pseudo-random number
qi=E keyi (IS) of (n-1)d bits from the ID of S using the key i of each server, and it is considered as the share of the key server. • from ( , ) , ⋯ , ( , ) , ⋯ , ( , ) such that the following equation is realized:
8. The dealer generates the partial shares as follows using the assigned and calculated • :
9. The dealer generates the remaining shares by connecting each partial share and distributes to the server except (1 ≤ ≤ ) . The server stores the shares. We call the server data server. = ( , ) || ( , ) || … || ( , ) ( ∈ 0,1
[Restoration] When we restore S, we select k servers from n servers and send the ID of S to the servers. When we select a key server i, the server generates and sends the share = (IS). When we select a data server, the server sends the stored share. S is restored by the same restoration process as in 3.1 using these k shares.
Application to LEACH
The second scheme has the same premise as the first scheme except that CH has a pseudo-random number generator.
[Distribution] is the sensing data f i that was encrypted using the link key L i .
2. The CH generates W i0 using the pseudo-random number generator from ID i and key CH , and restores L i from W i0 and W i1 . 3. The CH obtains the sensing data f i by decrypting E Li (f i ) using L i . 4. The CH deletes the link key L i .
Security Assessment
The scheme in 4.1 has computational security, depending on the used pseudo-random number, but the proof is omitted because of page restrictions. The security of the second scheme is shown as follows:
Security against CH Analysis
When the CH is analyzed, a key for generating the shares will be revealed. This is equivalent to the case in which all the shares in CH are revealed in the first scheme. In the second scheme, since each link key is independently set up as in the first scheme, no link key is revealed from just one share. This means that the second scheme has information theoretical security similar to the first scheme on CH analysis.
Security against Child Node Analysis
The link key of a child node is also revealed in the second scheme. In this scheme, W i0 = and W i1 =L i ⨁ . When the node ID i is analyzed, is known from W i1 and L i . If the pseudo-random numbers that are used are vulnerable, may be obtained from some . However, even in such a case, if W j1 in node ID j is not obtained, L j is not revealed, since the analysis of = W j0 does not contain L j . That is, the key of a node that is not analyzed is not revealed at all, even if many child nodes may be analyzed, and the second scheme has information theoretical security also on child node analysis.
Security against CH and Child Node Analysis
The second scheme as well as the first scheme has the same security as far as child node analysis is concerned.
Security against Eavesdropping on Communication Paths
In the key sharing and encrypted communication phase, W i1 is sent as it is from a child node. If is known because of the vulnerability of the pseudorandom numbers, L i may be revealed, since W i1 contains L i . Therefore, in this case, it is accepted that this scheme depends on the computational security of the pseudo-random numbers that were used.
THIRD SCHEME AND ITS VARIATIONS
Application to LEACH
The third scheme has the same premise as the first scheme except that each node does not have a link key. In this scheme, it is assumed that threshold k=m+1 and m>1. This means even if all the child nodes are analyzed, none of the keys are revealed at all. In addition, we assume that nodes up to u (0 ≤ ≤ − 2) may be unable to communicate.
[ If this scheme selects the secret sharing scheme in 4.1 instead of that of 3.1, and all child node are set as key server (t=m), none of the child nodes would have any share; instead, they would simply be managing a key.
We show a variation suitable for group key sharing. It changes the following portions of the third scheme.
[Distribution] 2. BS decides a group key L for a cluster, sets n=m+u+2 and k=m+2, and performs the secret sharing scheme in 3.1 for L as the secret information, and BS generates n shares W j (j=1,･･･,n). 3. All nodes including CH restores the link key L from the distributed m+1 shares and W m+2 . This variation is named the third dash scheme. This scheme can also select the secret sharing scheme in 4.1 instead of that of 3.1
BS encrypts each
W i (i=1,
Security Assessment
Security against CH Analysis
In the third and dash schemes, CH has u+2 (0 ≤ ≤ − 2) shares on one key. Therefore, none of the link keys are revealed even if CH is analyzed. These schemes have information theoretical security based on the secret sharing scheme in 3.1. Since key sharing between CH and each node occurs independently, even if two or more CH(s) are analyzed, the security does not change.
Security against Child Node Analysis
In the third scheme, each child node has one share on one key, the number of child nodes is , and k=m+1. Thus, none of the link keys are leaked if all the child nodes are analyzed.
In the dash scheme, each child node has one share W j for every node and a common share W m+2 , and k=m+2. Thus, any link key is not leaked if all the child nodes are analysed since the known share is m+1.
Security against CH and Child Node Analysis
The third scheme has robustness against analysis of CH and − u − 2 nodes, since CH has u+2 shares. The dash scheme has robustness against analysis of CH and − u − 1 nodes.
Security against Eavesdropping on Communication Path
Since the number of shares on communication path is less than threshold k, information theoretical security is realized in the third and dash schemes.
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We consider the case in which the number of child nodes is m and CH is 1 within a cluster. For simplicity, the length of each ID and each key is denoted by L, and the length of the sensing information is expressed by H. It is presupposed that one node communicates c times in one round. We evaluate the case in which all the child nodes share a key with the CH and one child node carries out encryption communication with the CH. In this case, the CH has already known the ID of all the child nodes, and the child node has already known the ID of the CH. In this evaluation, the BS is not a candidate for evaluation since it has enough electric power and computational resources; we thus evaluate only the CH and a child node. We compared SecLEACH and MS-LEACH with our schemes in the key sharing phase ("Distribution" in our schemes) and communication phase ("Key sharing and encrypted communication" in our schemes). We do not include SSKM in 2.4 in the comparison, since SSKM is clearly inefficient compared with other schemes.
Evaluation of the Communication Traffic
In SecLEACH, the number of keys that a node has is set to a, and the average number of keys that is in agreement with CH is set to b. From the viewpoint of communication traffic, MS-LEACH is the best. If a>m and b>c, the first and second schemes are better than SecLEACH. Although the third scheme is worst, if H is larger than mL enough, H becomes dominant, and the difference becomes small. 
Evaluation of the Memory Capacity
In LEACH, since all the nodes turn into CH, the memory size of the largest one serves as the amount of memory of all the nodes. The CH, except in the second and third dash scheme, stores the pair of IDs of child nodes and the keys, in addition to the memory capacity. Therefore, the second scheme is the best, and the second and third dash schemes do not need additional memory depending on the number of nodes. 
Evaluation of Computational Complexity
We counted the number of times of encryption and decryption since their computational complexity is larger than that of the other operations. Therefore, the computational complexity of the comparison of the key ID in SecLEACH and of the XOR operation in our schemes was set to 0. From the viewpoint of the computational complexity, SecLEACH is the best. The amount of calculation of MS-LEACH is larger than that of the first scheme and the third dash scheme, and if c<2m, it is larger than that of the second scheme, although the second scheme adds the c encryption of the ID in order to make a share. 
CONCLUSIONS
We proposed three key sharing schemes. The user can choose either of them according to the intended usage.
